COMMUNALISATION OF EDUCATION

 Supreme Court Judgement & After

 Arjun Dev

THE judgement delivered by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court on September 12 on the writ petition challenging the legality of the National Curriculum Framework for School Education (NCFSE) has been claimed as a great victory by the union minister of human resource development (HRD), the NCERT director and spokespersons of the Sangh Parivar’s organisations. The latter included a general secretary of the BJP and the general secretary of Vidya Bharati Akhil Bharatiya Shiksha Sansthan. They claimed that it was a vindication of the policies pursued by them during the past three years in the area of school education.

 Nay, even the prime minister, who was far away in New York when the judgement was delivered and was addressing a meeting organised by the Overseas Friends of the BJP, the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh and others, was enthused to say that it was a “good thing” that the country’s highest court had ended the controversy regarding the “saffronisation of education” and had held that “no saffronisation was going on.” He is also reported to have said “amid cheers from the audience” that “agar bhagvakaran ho bhi raha hai to kya apatti hai.” Many in the Sangh Parivar seem to have taken the view that the Supreme Court has given them sanction for going ahead with their programme of saffronisation.

 However, while an adverse judgement would have certainly made it difficult for the Sangh Parivar to implement their communal agenda, the judgement that was delivered by no means sanctions what the Parivar thinks it does. Much of the effusive self-congratulation is unwarranted and is, in fact, based on a distorted understanding of the judgement.

  DEATH SENTENCE ON CABE REJECTED

 In its judgement, the Supreme Court has focussed on two issues:

 (1) the role and importance of the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE) in approving the curriculum and whether the NCFSE can be held illegal in absence of the CABE’s approval, and

  (2) whether the inclusion of “education about religions” violates article 28(1) of the constitution.

  On the first issue, the three judges of the Supreme Court in their separate judgements agreed only on one point --- that non-consultation with the CABE cannot be the ground for setting aside the NCFSE. Two of them, Justice Dharmadhikari and Justice Sema, however, emphasised the importance of CABE and directed the Union of India to consult the CABE. In his judgement, Justice Dharmadhikari stated the following:

  “In evolving a national policy on education and based thereon a curriculum, in accordance with long standing practice, it was desirable to consult CABE although for non-consultation the national policy and the curriculum cannot be set aside by the court…. It is not the province of the court to decide on the good or bad points of an education policy. The court’s limited jurisdiction to intervene in implementation of a policy is only if it is found to be against any statute or the constitution. We have not found anything in the education policy or the curriculum, which is against the constitution. We have found no ground to grant any relief as prayed for by the petitioners. We would, however, direct the Union of India to consider the matter of filling the vacancies in the membership of CABE and convening a meeting of CABE for seeking opinion on the policy and the curriculum.”

  Justice Sema, in his judgement, dealt with the issue of CABE in detail. In his judgement, he stated the following:

  “While it is true that the CABE is a non-statutory body, one cannot overlook the fact that it has been in existence since 1935. It has also been accepted as an effective instrument of meaningful partnership between the states and the centre, particularly in evolving a consensus on the major policy issues in the field of human resource development. I am, therefore, of the view that the importance of the role played by CABE cannot be sidetracked on the plea that the body is non-statutory, particularly when it has been playing an important role in the past for evolving a consensus on the major policy decisions involving national policy on education….

  “In my view, sidestepping of such an important advisory board as CABE on the plea of non-reconstitution of nominated members is not proper. There is yet another reason as to why consultation of the board is highly essential in issues like relating to the state and central coordination in evolving a national consensus pertaining to national policy on education which require implementation in all the states, as the education has now been brought to the concurrent list by the 42nd amendment to the constitution. This would dispel the lurking suspicion in the minds of the people and also to project the transparency and purity in the decision making process of the government.

  “It is true, whether to continue or to discontinue such a board is within the realm of the executive authority, but as long as it exists, consultation with such a body, which has been in existence since 1935, cannot be side-tracked. The Union of India is, therefore, directed to consider the filling up of the vacancies of the nominated members of CABE and convene a meeting of CABE for seeking its opinion on National Curriculum Framework for School Education (NCFSE) as expeditiously as possible and, in any case, before the next academic session. This would not, however, mean that NCFSE 2000 published by NCERT is illegal for non-consultation of CABE.”

  Thus the Supreme Court has clearly rejected the death sentence pronounced by the union HRD minister and the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) on the CABE and has directed the Union of India to convene it.

  NCFSE LACKS NATIONAL STATUS

 It needs to be emphasised that the central role played by CABE in evolving a national consensus is not only because of its expert members who are nominated by the government of India, but primarily because of the presence on it of all states through their education ministers. The latter’s presence and approval imparts to the CABE decisions an authority for nationwide acceptance and implementation. It is only because the policies being pursued by the union HRD minister in the area of education, particularly in changing the curriculum, are not acceptable to a majority of states in the country that he has refused to convene the CABE and has pronounced it dead. After October 1998 he has not convened any meeting of the education ministers of states, which has been the other forum for consultation with states and evolving a national consensus. (On two occasions, in December 2000 and May 2002, he announced that he would convene a meeting of the ministers “next month” but did not.) What the government of India would do in respect of the Supreme Court’s directive and whether the implementation of the NCFSE would be held in abeyance till CABE’s opinion on it is obtained are not known. Perhaps the euphoria over what the minister and NCERT consider their victory has made them oblivious of the Supreme Court’s directive in this regard. For, even though more than three weeks have elapsed since the judgement was delivered, there has been no indication by the HRD minister that he is going to fill up the vacancies and convene the CABE.

  The HRD minister and NCERT authorities, it appears, are not aware that in the absence of consultation with and approval of the CABE or, alternatively, a conference or meeting of education ministers of states and union territories, the adjective ‘National’ in the NCFSE has little meaning. The Supreme Court judgement, in effect, only means that the Union of India is free to implement the NCFSE in schools, which are under its jurisdiction, through the only board --- Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) --- over which it can exercise its control. The Union of India or the NCERT have no authority, moral or legal, to enforce its implementation in the states. The number of secondary and higher secondary schools over which the Union of India can exercise its full control is less than five per cent of the total number of secondary and higher secondary schools in the country. (The percentage would be less than one if schools imparting elementary education are included.) They should also realise that even for the schools under the union government’s control, given the lack of any national consensus behind it and of the follow-up measures (the new syllabi and textbooks), the NCFSE would not last beyond the life of the present government.

  ON EDUCATION ABOUT RELIGIONS

 The other main issue on which the Supreme Court has given its judgement is in respect of education about religions which has been included as a major component of value education in the NCFSE. (Justice Shah and Justice Dharmadhikari have, in their separate judgements, gone into the issue in detail while Justice Sema has concurred with the views of Justice Shah.) All the three judges gave the verdict that giving education about religions does not violate article 28(1) of the constitution. According to them, what is prohibited is imparting of religious instruction, not education about religions. Two of the judges, in fact, emphasised at length the importance of education about religions though the reasons given by them for this view are different.

  The judgement may be considered flawed in many respects.

  The judges seem to have presumed that it is the first time that the role of education in promoting values has been emphasised in a curriculum document. They have accepted the view expressed in NCFSE that religion is a major source of values. They have given a predominant place to religion in value education, which is contrary to the basic principles of value education laid down in the national policy on education as well as the basic thrusts of the Chavan committee report. The two judgements in which this issue has been dealt with differ in crucial respects, including on the specific meaning they give to “education about religions.” It can be argued that neither is in consonance with the principle of providing education about different religions.

  The judges seem to have totally ignored the specific examples of bias that were brought to the notice of the court. This bias was evident in the syllabi brought out by NCERT, the importance given to the obscure (and obscurantist) concept of Spiritual Quotient, the general orientation of the NCFSE in terms of “indigenisation” (meaning only ancient, Vedic), tampering with and diluting the concepts of gender equality and scientific temper, and in the deletions ordered by the NCERT from its existing history textbooks. It was pointed out, for example, that the exclusion of Islam from the Class VI social science syllabus brought out by NCERT showed a bias against Islam, and the deletions from textbooks tampered with historical knowledge with a view to imposing a blatantly communal view of Indian history

  In their discussion on religious education, the two judgements have referred to their concept of secularism. Some of the views expressed by the judges on the question of religious education, and relating it to the concept of secularism, have already attracted comment and a review and revision of the judgement has been suggested. It is not unlikely that some of these issues may come up before a larger bench of the Supreme Court for reconsideration.

  While the discussion on some of these issues will continue, it is important to note the words of caution in Justice Dharmadhikari’s judgement. While agreeing with Justice Shah’s view that education of religions can be imparted even in “educational institutions maintained out of state funds,” he has given his own opinion on the question. According to him, “education on religion which can be imparted in “educational institutions fully maintained out of state funds” as mentioned in clause (1) of article 28 of the constitution has to be education of a nature different from religious education or religious instructions which can be imparted in educational institutions maintained by minorities or those “established under any endowment or trust” as referred in clause (2) of article 28.”

  He has also stated, “There is a very thin dividing line between imparting of “religious instructions” and “study of religions.” Special care has to be taken to avoid the possibility of imparting “religious instructions” in the name of “religious education” or “study of religions”.”

  He further stated, “This distinction between “religious instructions” and “religious education” has to be maintained while introducing a curriculum of religious education and implementing it. This would require a constant vigil on the part of those imparting religious education from primary stage to the higher level, otherwise there is a potent danger of religious education being perverted by educational authorities, whosoever may be in power, by imparting in the name of “religious education,” “religious instructions” in which they have faith and belief.”

  As education about religions is to be introduced from the primary stage, the court seems to have though that the responsibility for preventing the “danger of religious education being perverted by educational authorities,” lies solely on the six million odd teachers who would be “imparting religious education.” The teachers are expected to be aware of the “thin line” and vigilant about not crossing it, even if the educational authorities try to make them to do so. The teachers themselves, it is presumed, would not be imparting “religious instructions” in which they have faith and belief, even if the educational authorities would like them to impart “religious education” in the sense defined in the judgement. In spite of these problems, the words of caution as given in the judgement are important to take note of.

  A MAJOR FLAW IN JUDGEMENT

 From a reading of what Justice Shah and Justice Dharmadhikari have stated, it appears that a major flaw in the judgement is basically due to a completely erroneous assumption they have made. The assumption is that imparting knowledge about religions has been under a ban all these years. (Let us leave aside another assumption --- that this ban has resulted in the erosion of moral values.) Justice Dharmadhikari has gone to the extent of stating that “The result of this has been that we do not allow our students even touch of our religious books.”

  This assumption has absolutely no basis in reality. There is no school curriculum in any part of the country, which does not include the study of various religions and does not have lessons on religious saints and personalities as well as religious festivals. A large number of textbooks in the country carry, in fact, prayers of a particular religion. All social studies and history courses, syllabi and textbooks, include descriptions of various religions, biographies of their founders, their basic tenets and observances, and of various religious reform movements that arose in different periods of history. (We mention here only what is part of the formal curriculum. We have excluded here any reference to the gross religiosity one finds in the family, the neighbourhood and the society at large, as is evident in the jagarans, religious gatherings and processions, religious discourses in both print and electronic media, the conversion and reconversion campaigns, the emphasis on rituals, and the proliferation of saints and gurus including non-denominational spiritual guides, with enormous following, and the virtual disappearance of any campaign against superstition and meaningless rituals. Nor do we refer to the kind of campaigns because of which we use the term “awakening” to describe the 19th century India. We also exclude the use of religion and religious symbols for political mobilisation, the conduct of hate campaigns and the resort to killings often with the support and connivance of, if not sponsored by, the authorities. In the entire programme of education about religions, and also in the Supreme Court judgement about it, there is nothing, not a word, regarding awareness of the misuse of religion in the past and, even more so, now.)

  The problem is not of any ban on or exclusion of the study of religions but their biased and inauthentic presentation in many cases. While one religion (Islam) is often presented to be basically intolerant, others such as Buddhism and Jainism have been held responsible, because of their emphasis on non-violence (ahimsa) for weakening the country and for the defeats suffered by Indian rulers in the past. These distortions have been brought to light in the various reports of textbook evaluation prepared by the NCERT from time to time.

  ATTEMPTS AT COMMUNALISATION

 It is a fact that the government headed by a political formation which has always exploited and misused religion for political purposes and to foment communal strife, has been giving, in its educational programme, primacy to religious education for promoting moral and ethical values.  The textbooks brought out by state governments, whenever they were under BJP control, have been found to be replete with communal biases. The NCERT has, in the past, brought out reports on the textbooks prepared in the BJP-ruled states. Before the present government, the only time the government of India sought to sponsor communalisation of education was during the Janata Party rule, in which Jan Sangh (the earlier version of BJP) had a strong presence. The educational materials brought out by the Sangh Parivar’s organisations have always spread hatred against other religions as an integral part of their “educational” agenda. One of the reports prepared by the National Steering Committee set up by the government of India dealt with the publications of Vidya Bharati, the Sangh Parivar’s main body working at the school level. In its recommendations, the committee stated the following:

  “The committee agrees with the report that much of the material in the Sanskriti Jnan series (a series of Vidya Bharati publications extensively used in Vidya Bharati schools) is designed to promote bigotry and religious fanaticism in the name of inculcating knowledge of culture in the young generation.”

  It may be recalled that so far the present HRD minister has convened only one conference of state education ministers, in October 1998, and that ended in a fiasco. The reason was his (aborted) attempt to introduce a document prepared by this body for what it called “the spiritualisation, Indianisation and nationalisation” of curriculum.

  The main thrust, the “ideological” orientation, of the NCFSE is the same as that of the document prepared by Vidya Bharati in 1998. In its review of NCERT’s history textbooks published by this organisation, specific objection was taken to the concept of a composite culture. It is not without significance that a jubilee celebration of this organisation, held when the case was pending in Supreme Court, was attended by the union HRD minister, besides other leaders of the Sangh Parivar. In their critique of the NCFSE, in the annexures to their petition and during the hearing, the petitioners had brought all these matters to the knowledge of the court. It is clear from the judgement that the court took little note of these materials.

  WHY THE MOVE TO REPLACE BOOKS

 It may be noted that NCERT’s history textbooks, which are being replaced, provided for the study of every major religion in its historical context and the changes or reforms that have taken place in them during various periods of history. They also included the study of religious beliefs and practices of the ancient civilisations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, Rome, Mayas, Incas and Aztecs as well as of the prehistoric man. These books provided for an academic study of religions, as distinct from inculcating religiosity among children or indoctrinating them in values derived from religion. They discussed the contributions made by various religions to art and culture in different periods and the place of these religions in the social and political life of the country. They also dwelt on the misuse of religion in history for political purposes and for various other forms of exploitation, and for fostering and spreading communalism during India’s freedom struggle and in the period since independence. With their stress on academic authenticity in the study of religions and the latter’s contribution to the development of Indian civilisation and India’s composite culture, these books sought to promote among students a spirit of understanding and harmony.

  On the other hand, it is clear from a reading of the NCFSE --- with its emphasis on indigenisation, obscure and obscurantist concepts like Spiritual Quotient, an unhistorical and chauvinist view of India’s ancient culture (not excluding even a false and fake translation of an Upanishad) --- that the purpose of including religion as a major component of the new curriculum is to promote not harmony in society but a sectarian and obscurantist outlook in pursuance of the Parivar’s communal agenda.

  It is, however, necessary to note that while the Supreme Court did not accept the petitioners’ contention regarding religious education as being violative of article 28(1) and of the secular feature of the constitution, the references in the judgement to the “very thin dividing line between religious instruction and study of religions” and the “potent danger of religious education being perverted” are not without significance. It would be incumbent on secular individuals and groups to exercise a constant vigil in this regard to prevent the authorities from crossing the thin line and perverting religious education, and to ensure that the basic purposes of education --- promotion of a rational outlook, critical thinking and independence of judgement and cultivation of a scientific temper --- are not diluted in the name of religious education.

  Justice Dharmadhikari has also referred to the “scrutiny of textbooks” to be undertaken by experts, academicians and educationists “to find out whether they conform to the secular thought of the country.” According to him, a “suitable curriculum, which accords with secularism as understood in wide and benevolent sense,” has to be evolved on the basis of a general consensus.

  ISSUES ABOUT  HISTORY IGNORED

 The Supreme Court has almost entirely ignored the questions relating to history --- the decision to drastically curtail the quantum of history, the narrow sectarian and chauvinistic orientation which the NCFSE and NCERT’s new syllabi have given to history and which would virtually destroy the study of this subject as an academic discipline, the deletions which the NCERT ordered from its textbooks which were written by some of the country’s most outstanding scholars on grounds which were completely unhistorical and blatantly communal (without even consulting the authors), the secrecy surrounding the preparation of new history textbooks with even the names of the new author-historians being kept a secret, etc. Only Justice Shah referred, in one sentence, to the petitioners’ view regarding distortion of history and, quoting a sentence from the petition, rejected it. He stated that “The aforesaid submission does not deserve any consideration”.

  But this ignoring of the issues relating to history, virtually in their entirety, is surprising because these issues are crucial to the basic issue of communalisation and were raised for their importance even in the context of religious education. It was not realised that “perversion of religious education,” mentioned by Justice Dharmadhikari as a hypothetical possibility, has been taking place in the schools, mainly as a part of the perversion of history education. The present attempt by the Union of India, through the instrumentality of NCERT, is meant to give this perversion a formal official sanction.

  A point was, for example, raised about the bias against Islam as evident in the NCERT’s new history syllabus. It was pointed out that while the Class VI social science syllabus refers to Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Confucianism along with their tenets and values, Islam has been excluded. According to the NCERT, this was done because Islam arose after the period covered in the Class VI syllabus which was up to the 7th century, coinciding with the period of the Pallavas, and because Islam “flourished much later, viz after 12th century in India.” It was pointed out that the syllabus mentions Khajuraho, Konark and Chidambaram temples which were built in the 11th-12th centuries, long after the 7th century, that the Pallavas remained the most powerful dynasty till the middle of the 8th century in the deep south and, though weakened after their defeat at the hands of the Chalukyas, survived for another century, and that Islam flourished in many parts of India, viz Sind, Multan, parts of Punjab, Gujarat and Kerala centuries before the 12th century.

  While all this may be attributed to the NCERT authorities’ ignorance of elementary chronology, the exemplary historical inventiveness and ingenuity displayed by them in establishing that Confucianism flourished in India before the 7th century is truly amazing. According to them, the Chinese living in Burma were followers of Confucianism and Burma was then a part of India. All this, and more, is stated by them on affidavit filed by them in the Supreme Court.

  The Supreme Court, as stated above, has said little on issues relating to history. However, the spokesmen of the Sangh Parivar have welcomed the judgement, claiming that it has vindicated their stand on history and sanctioned their version of history.

  In this context, the statement issued by the general secretary of Vidya Bharati Akhil Bharatiya Shiksha Sansthan, the organisation which is known particularly for its role in promoting religious fanaticism and is the apex body of the Sangh Parivar in the area of school education, is especially notable. According to him, “What more pleasing can it be that the bench of the hon’ble judges has underlined the importance of the teaching of ‘dharma’ in schools” and that “this (judgement) will help to throw the anti-national and anti-dharma out of the syllabus.” (Surely, Vidya Bharati’s conception of ‘dharma,’ from what is commonly known about it, is not the same as that of the Supreme Court judges.) “Now”, according to him, “the future generation will not have to learn the Aryans as outsiders and the Mughals as the natives of the land; will not have to admit our ancestors as beef-eaters for no proof or reason; will not have to treat Rama and Krishna as myths. Glorious history of Rani Padmini will no more be folklore. History will no more describe Sikh Gurus as corrupt, plunderers and thugs. Aurangzeb will no longer be treated as living saint (peer). Now, the Jains, the Sikhs, the Jats and the Gujars will come out as very respectful races in the history….”

  The references to Sikh Gurus, Jains, etc, in the statement are a repetition of the lies which the minister, the NCERT director and others of the Parivar have been propagating to justify the deletions ordered by the NCERT from the existing books. The authoritative tone of the statement leaves no doubt that the Vidya Bharati version of history will now become the official version of the government of India and its ‘professional’ bodies; it will no longer be the version limited to the Parivar’s own schools and shakhas. The perversion of history will now be a ‘national’ policy --- sanctioned, it is claimed, by the Supreme Court.

(The author recently retired as professor of history from the NCERT.)