US IMPERIALISM AND THE IRAN NUCLEAR CRISIS - II

Anil Biswas

ON February 4 2006, the IAEA vote mooted a resolution that condemned Iran for lack of transparency over its nuclear programme and referred the issue to the Security Council.  The following is the full text of the resolution:

The Board of Governors [of the IAEA]

1. Recalling all the resolutions adopted by the Board on Iran's nuclear programme,

2. Recalling also the Director General's reports,

3. Recalling that Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty,

4. Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for the professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran of the suspension,

5. Recalling that in reports referred to above, the Director General noted that after nearly three years of intensive verification activity, the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme or to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran,

6. Recalling Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and the absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of those activities and other issues arising from the Agency's verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002,

7. Recalling that the Director General has stated that Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue for the Agency to be able to clarify outstanding issues,

8. Recalling the requests of the Agency for Iran's cooperation in following up on reports relating to equipment, materials and activities which have applications in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the nuclear military area

9. Recalling that in November 2005 the Director General reported that Iran possesses a document related to the procedural requirements for the reduction of UF6 [uranium hexafluoride] to metal in small quantities, and on casting and machining of enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms,

10. Expressing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear programme, and agreeing that an extensive period of confidence-building is required from Iran,

11. Reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.

12. Underlines that outstanding questions can best be resolved and confidence built in the exclusive peaceful nature of Iran's programme by Iran responding positively to the calls for confidence building measures which the Board has made on Iran, and in this context deems it necessary for Iran to:

Re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and processing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the Agency; reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water; ratify promptly and implement in full Additional Protocol; pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol with Iran signed on 18 December 2003; implement the transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, which extend beyond the former requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations;

1. Requests the Director General to report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these steps are required of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue;

2. Expresses serious concern that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this process is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components; and requests Iran to maintain this document under Agency seal and to provide a full copy to the Agency;

3. Deeply regrets that, despite repeated calls from the Board for the maintaining of the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities which the Board has declared essential to addressing outstanding issues, Iran resumed uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan facility on 8 August 2005 and took steps to resume enrichment activities on 10 January 2006;

4. Calls on Iran to understand that the Board lacks confidence in its intentions in seeking to develop a fissile material production capability against the background of Iran's record on safeguards as recorded in previous Resolutions, and unresolved questions; and to consider its position both in relation to confidence-building measures and in relation to negotiations that can result in increased confidence;

5. Requests Iran to extend full and prompt cooperation to the Agency, which the Director General deems indispensable and overdue, and in particular to help the agency clarify possible activities which could have a military nuclear dimension;

6. Requests the Director General to continue with his efforts to implement the Agency's Safeguards Agreement with Iran, to implement the Additional Protocol to that Agreement pending its entry into force, with a view to providing credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and to pursue additional transparency measures required for the Agency to be able to resolve outstanding issues and reconstruct the history and nature of all aspects of Iran's past nuclear activities;

7. Requests the Director General to report to the next regular session of the Board on the implementation of this and previous resolutions and convey to the Security Council that report together with any Resolution from the March Board;

8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

IMPLICATION OF RESOLUTION

What in support is the Resolution of trying to bring about. The resolution has four case aims: 1) That Iran suspend the process of enrichment of uranium with verification by the IAEA; 2) Iran to stop constructing a heavy water (deuterium) plant, 3) Iran ratify the IAEA protocol de novo; and 4) Iran demonstrate transparency of measures over its nuclear programme.

The five permanent members of the Security Council, the P 5, closed ranks and voted for the resolution, followed by 27 of the 35 members of the IAEA concluding India. Three nations—Cuba, Venezuela, and Syria – voted against, and five countries abstained: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, and South Africa.

IRANIAN REACTION  

The response from Iran was immediate: Ali Khamenei stated that the move was clearly an attack on Iran’s sovereignty and integrity, the voting a move orchestrated and led by the US as part of its drive of global hegemonism, and demonstrative of the political arrogance of the Bush administration.  Mildly regretting how “friendly countries had voted for the IAEA resolution,” Ali Khamenei went on to declare that while Iran would continue to act with prudence and patience, there should no expectation from any quarter about the basic position of Iran’s nuclear programme being carried on for peaceful purposes: Iran would never ever bow to threats.

Expectedly, the Iran nuclear crisis has escalated following the IAEA resolution.  President Ahmadinejad has said that Iran would no longer allow snap inspection of its nuclear sites, followed by Iran expression its intention to go ahead with a full-scale uranium enrichment programme for peaceful purposes.  Further Iran declared that it would stop voluntary implementation of the additional NPT protocols to which it had agreed earlier. The 16 February meeting between Iran and Russia has since fallen through, and Russia’s offering Iran enriched uranium came in to serious doubt. (For subsequent development see accompanying on this page) And the US has succeeded its US game plan Iran deny the International protocols.  Certainly, this is what has been in, with sanctions very much on the cards, US President Bush has said that the next target was to send a ‘clear message to the regime in Iran’ that ‘threats, concealment, and breaking of international norms will no longer be tolerated.’

Subsequently China came out with a brief response to the and on February 7, crisis unfolding in the Middle East over the Iran nuclear crisis, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson stated the crisis should be resolved within the framework of the IAEA. The emphasized the importance of non-proliferation and called for extended negotiations, multi-lateral in character while acknowledging the fact that the crisis in the Middle east around Iran was embroiled in a complicated and difficult situation.  Calling for all parties involved to maintain restraint and prudence, the Chinese spokesperson said that there should be no resort to force and that the stress should be on diplomatic interfaces.

INDIA AND IRAN NUCLEAR CRISIS

In keeping with the outlook of the US and the EU 3, India, fresh and eager to tow the US line over Iran, has seen a well-balanced prudence’ in the IAEA resolution.  The resolution, a Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson said, was praiseworthy because it had ‘purchased a period of time’ before the  March 6, meeting of the IAEA to convince Iran of the necessity of adhering to International norms over its nuclear programme.  Ever double-faced, the view of the UPA government over the IAEA voting was that India’s vote against Iran was “not to be considered as detracting in any manner from the traditionally close and friendly India-Iran relationship.”

In a strong criticism of India’s stand at the IAEA, the Left parties have questioned the IAEA resolution itself.  The CPI (M) general secretary Prakash Karat has pointed out that at the present juncture, the resolution would hardly help in resolving the Iran nuclear issue through negotiations, rather, the CPI (M) leader IAEA resolution pointed out would aggravate the situation. India, he maintained should not be a party to a referral of the Iran issue to the Security Council, come the 6 March 2006 meeting of the IAEA.  He was full of praise for the role of by the NAM countries which had recently come out with a resolution that called for the establishment in the Middle East, of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction.  The NAM statement calls for a fuller cooperation between Iran and the IAEA, recalling that for the past two-and-half years, Iran had suspended its programme of enriching uranium.

PARTY STAND

At the Kolkata session of the meeting of the CPI (M) Polit Bureau meeting, it was resolved that India should not be party to any move in the IAEA for referring the Iran nuclear issue to the UN Security Council.  The next meeting of the IAEA on March 6 will be taking up this issue.  The Polit Bureau noted that the UPA government from the time of the September 24 vote in the IAEA had been pursuing a line of aligning with the US and the EU-3 who are bent on targeting Iran.  The United States wants to take the same route as in Iraq by referring Iran to the Security Council.  The CPI (M) emphasizes that it is in India’s national interests to maintain its friendly ties with Iran as it has vital stakes in the Middle East.

Since the Manmohan Singh government has refused to heed public opinion, the Left parties decided to demand a debate in parliament ahead of the March 6 board meeting.  If March 6, the government insists on voting for a referral to the Security Council then the government will be put in the dock in parliament again.  The CPI (M) appeals to all political parties to realize that the United States is utilizing the nuclear cooperation issue to browbeat India into falling in line with its plan to target Iran.

(Concluded)