People's Democracy

KODIYERI BALAKRISHNAN'S SPEECH

'Comprehensive Strategy Needed To Defeat Terror'

The following is the text of the speech delivered by Kerala home minister Kodiyeri Balakrishnan at the conference of chief ministers on internal security held in New Delhi on January 6, 2009

WE meet here today against the background of terror in Mumbai. We are all witness to the gallant efforts put in by our brave police officials and soldiers who risked their lives to defend our freedom. We salute those who laid down their lives in our defense as well as those civilians who became innocent victims of blind terror.

We commend the union government for the initiative in convening this conference. This conference is a proclamation that we are united in our resolve to resist terror in all its forms and to fight any terrorists wherever they are. We realise that it is the joint responsibility of the centre and the states to fight the designs of those evil forces which threaten to destroy the freedoms that we cherish.

Kerala, when compared to the rest of the country, has had no serious incident relating to a terrorist strike within the state. In recent years, there have been no explosions and no violence on this count. But we are aware that the threat is real. We perceive that no part of India can be declared free from the danger of a terrorist strike. We are also acutely conscious of manipulations by extremist groups to create a foothold in Kerala and disturb the peaceful communal balance that the Kerala society has been able to maintain in recent years.

STRENGTHENED INTELLIGENCE

Aware of this great danger and in order to curb the growth of terrorism, the government of Kerala initiated action as early as 2006 to progressively implement various steps. As is well known, intelligence capabilities cannot be built up overnight. It requires systematic training and up-gradation of skills and equipments. The field operatives also have to gain valuable experience over time. Development of information channels also takes time. From 2006 onwards we have been progressively strengthening the same. We believe that, at least partly as a result of this, we have been able to keep in check the activities of isolated misguided elements to promote terrorism and indulge in terrorist acts. Simultaneously, by social and political action we have also been able to isolate the terrorists from getting any sympathy from any major group within any community. It may be recalled that recently four Malayali men were killed in Kashmir as they were attempting to cross over to PoK. The plaintive, yet courageous, cry of the mother who publicly proclaimed that she did not even want to see the face of her dead son -- who had become a terrorist � is the cry that echoes in the heart of Kerala.

The government of Kerala took steps during 2007 to seek central help in establishing a Regional Intelligence Training School which was inaugurated in January 2008. This centre is run by the Intelligence Bureau and is giving training to intelligence staff in all the southern states. We have also institutionalised an extremely elaborate State Police Monitoring Room which remains in continuous contact with the districts and police stations on one hand and with senior officers and ministers on the other hand. This has expedited emergency responses and decision-making during crises. We have recently enacted and implemented the Kerala Anti-Social Activities Prevention Act which is directed against all types of anti-social activities like goondaism, land-grabbing, loan-sharking etc. Mechanisms are also in place for continuous briefing of the home minister and the senior officials. Though we have reasons to believe that these systems have worked well so far, we are taking action to further strengthen the staff, equipment and procedures in this regard.

STTEPS NEEDED TO COUNTER TERROR

Regarding the general strategy to counter the threat to internal security from terrorism, extremism and militancy as well as the threat of infiltration from outside the country we suggest the following for consideration of the government of India and all the states:

1. The Regional Intelligence Training Center (RITC) which is run jointly by the Kerala Police and the Intelligence Bureau for training of the intelligence staff of the southern states may be strengthened by further infusion of manpower and equipment. Instead of being considered an ad hoc arrangement, the RITC may be institutionalised as a regular training institution and such institutions may be started in other regions of India also. It may be noted that these centres besides giving training in skills also serve to create a national perspective and encourage knowledge sharing among different officers of the centre and the states.

2. One of the urgent needs is for all the states to have proper commando units. We are taking action in this regard. What is urgently required is a facility for imparting high-quality training to commandos. It is requested that the government of India may allocate a commando training centre to be located in Kerala.

3. Our experience in the last two years has shown us the inter-state operational style of terrorist organisations. Some Kerala youth were taken outside Kerala to a city in another state and they were trained there and persuaded to go to yet another state for terrorism-related activity. Some isolated instances of Keralites staying outside Kerala indulging in anti-national activities have also come to notice. Similarly some non-Keralites are understood to be coming to Kerala as tourists and, under the cover of tourist activities, are known to be meeting each other and exchanging information and views. Monitoring and probing such inter-state linkages are beyond the competence of individual state policing machineries. There could be some terrorist activity in one state in which people from another state could have also been involved. Presently a state police force has no idea of the leads which the police of another state might have obtained in the investigation of a particular terrorist activity. The former comes to know of it only when the latter informs it for seeking assistance in effecting some arrests in the former state. We feel that an institutionalised system of continuous intelligence sharing among states and centre must be worked out. Further, mutual help and assistance in surveillance and in dissemination of operational grade intelligence is also required.

4. In this regard the central intelligence agencies also need to play a much more active role in giving good quality intelligence support to state intelligence agencies with regard to inter-state movement of suspect characters. Though a large volume of messages are sent, most of these messages pertain to matters generally well-known otherwise also from news reports or from previous experience about which the states are already aware. Warning of terrorist strikes on days of national importance, festival days, anniversaries, and VVIP visit etc are not operational intelligence inputs. Information without any specificity of time and place, that a certain type of danger is possible can hardly be called an actionable intelligence inputs. There are myriad ways in which terrorists may strike. In a modern society not even a fraction of all the potential targets can be protected. The resources of the police are limited. The police forces would be meaningfully helped only if the intelligence is specific. Therefore it is requested that whenever central intelligence agencies get intelligence inputs of real operational value, it must be immediately shared with the state intelligence chief. Central intelligence agencies and even state police should not show reluctance to part with actionable information if we are to achieve coherence in our efforts.

5. Practically, all major modes of inter-state transport like rail and air are under the control of the government of India. We notice that there is a tendency to strengthen the physical security of the air and rail facilities by progressively excluding state government agencies from such premises. This may be good for the purpose of physical protection of trains, railway stations, airports and airplanes. But the central agencies like the RPF or the CISF are hardly ever in a position to remain alert to the activities of anti-national elements who use rail and air transport facilities liberally to remain in mutual contact and to establish national and international linkages. For example, a well known criminal going to another city from Chennai has virtually nothing to fear of being recognised by the CISF personnel. Therefore excluding the state police forces from airports or strengthening of the RPF at the cost of the GRP on trains may have the unintended consequence of facilitating easier movements of suspects and terrorists across India (while of course ensuring better physical security of the railways and airports). Therefore some surveillance activities inside airports, railway stations and on trains by the state police forces have to be deliberately and consistently encouraged and progressively strengthened. The government of India may subsidise state governments which incur expenses in this regard.

6. Mobile telephony and internet are great blessings indeed. But they have also become the handmaidens of terror. The state governments have little control over them. Greater control of state government, state police and state intelligence has to be there for checking misuse of these facilities. For this purpose the government of India should enact legislation enabling state governments also to take action against all types of service providers, including mobile companies, who give connections without verifying addresses or who do not give a proper and quick response to police requests for information or general assistance in relation to some crime, or enquiry related to terrorism or national security; or against internet websites who commit or promote crimes; or against internet cafes who do not follow the law and who do not keep proper records of identity of users etc. It is a fact that quite often local police have a very difficult time in getting information from service providers unless somebody has a personal rapport at some level, or very senior officers throw their weight. Section 91 of the CrPC needs to be suitably amended for this purpose so that an improper or delayed response by private or even government owned service providers becomes a punishable offence.

7. More than ever before, coastal security has become a matter of national concern. There is an urgent need to consider the area between the shore line and the limit of territorial waters as a Border Area just as certain areas situated on the land borders are considered as Border Areas. Preventing infiltration into such Border Areas is, and must be, deemed to be a central responsibility while enforcing the law in these areas is a state responsibility. Therefore as is done all along the land borders, the government of India must take on a more intensive role in protecting the sea border. Off the coast of Kerala, more than a lakh square kilometres of the sea are being patrolled by only very few ships of the Coast Guard. This is hardly adequate. The Coast Guard capability in this regard must be enhanced.

8. At the same time there is an urgent need for strengthening all the police stations along the coastline. The equipments of the police stations need to be enhanced for effective intervention and patrolling of the coastline. Greater central subsidy is to be given for this.

9. The special coastal police stations which are now specially sanctioned under the government of India scheme should also have sufficient staff. It needs to be appreciated that the cost on staff is very heavy and recurring. Therefore the government of India has to subsidise at least 50 per cent of the additional manpower cost. Further, since running these boats is very expensive, the full cost of fuel and navigational expenses must also be borne by the government of India. For protecting the long sea border, the government of India must incur a cost proportionate and comparable to that incurred with regard to the Border Areas on the land border. What is being earmarked at present under the coastal security scheme is only a fraction of the real requirements for effective coastal security. It is also requested that the boats, which were promised in 2005, may be given early.

10. With regard to improving coastal security, Kerala also feels that we should take the communities of fishermen living all along the coastline into confidence. We have already launched a programme intended to tap the information available through the vast number of sea-going fishermen. This programme envisages to form Coastal Vigilance Committee which brings together sea-going fishermen, boat owners and police personnel. Reliable persons among them are being enabled to watch out for suspicious activities along the coastline and the sea and they are expected to communicate information to the nearby police station over phone. Since the penetration and dispersal of the fishermen is quite intense and widespread, their cooperation is vital in the task of ensuring coastal security. The government of India may include this for special assistance from border management funds so that some part of expenses which are incurred in this connection are subsidised by the government of India. Such financial assistance will also help in giving motivation to the border population.

11. The coastline would require to be protected forever. While the scheme can be made operational for the time being with hired boats, hired crew and perhaps even with some retired coast guard or navy personnel re-employed for the purpose, none of them is, however, a permanent solution. A permanent solution would entail the state police forces to have trained personnel manning the boats. There is a system of the coast guard imparting a short training. A proper solution is to have a Marine Police Academy where systematic training could be imparted to police personnel. This could become a permanent resource center. The state of Kerala is willing to earmark land for this at Ezhimala near the existing Naval Academy.

12. Another area which requires immediate attention is the size of central assistance in the scheme of modernisation of police forces. In this connection it is noticed that for states like Kerala, the funds allocation under modernisation of police forces scheme has been coming down in both actual and real terms. The size of the central assistance was more than Rs 30 crore per year in 2000 and 2001. This was brought down to about Rs 23 crore in 2006. actually the allocation of Rs 30 core in 2000-01 should have been increased to a central assistance component of at least Rs 60 crore by 2007. it is necessary that greater amounts as central assistance component is incorporated in the MoPF scheme for the state.

13. The scheme of MoPF now permits only purchase of equipment. Actually what need to be modernized are the procedures. Therefore modernisation scheme should also take into account the need for developing software systems and maintaining operational efficiency by meeting recurring costs of equipments purchased under modernisation.

14. In the context of terrorism one urgent area of attention is the menace of Hawala. The state police have not been given any significant role under the foreign exchange management act. The offences under the foreign exchange management act are no longer cognizable criminal offences unlike the provisions of the foreign exchange regulation act under which police could act with greater effectiveness. Therefore the government of India may consider enacting more stringent legislation and invest the police with more powers to deal with the menace of hawala, at least when the transaction exceeds a minimum value.

15. Another area of great concern is the manner of utilisation of funds under the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act by suspected persons and groups. The state government must be enabled under this act to verify whether the money received as contribution is actually utilised for the purposes claimed. State governments must also be enabled to give a No Objection Certificate every year so that the NOC once granted does not continue to be valid for indefinite periods.

16. Regarding the National Investigating Agency, we feel that in the current scheme, there is little to empower the state police forces. The NIA would investigate terrorism related castes but the state police forces would not become any wiser or knowledgeable by the experience. The state police forces should not be denied the experience and responsibility of investigating terrorist cases. Only cases where the matter is beyond the competence of the state police should go to the NIA. If the NIA is given over-riding powers of taking over a case or letting its opinion prevail under all circumstances, this may lead to conflict and even a strain in center-state relations. Hence we are of the opinion that there should be a system by which cases are transferred to the NIA only with the consent of the concerned state government or governments. In any case, the state should not be deprived of its constitutional authority to interpret the significance of a crime or to investigate a criminal offence within its jurisdiction.

We are also of the opinion that terrorism, unlike the dacoity problem of the past, should not be treated as mere police problem. There has to be a social and political debate and serious societal and governmental intervention to address basic problems which the terrorist exploits. A strictly police response to terror treating everyone as a suspect entails the risk of breeding more terror. The problem of terrorism needs to be addressed at various levels including societal, social, political, developmental and education --- all of which must go hand-in-hand.

Together, as a people and a nation, we will fight the menace of terrorism and together, we shall overcome the challenge.